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Abstract—Bitcoin has become the most popular cryptocur-
rency based on a peer-to-peer network. In Aug. 2017, Bitcoin was
split into the original Bitcoin (BTC) and Bitcoin Cash (BCH).
Since then, miners have had a choice between BTC and BCH
mining because they have compatible proof-of-work algorithms.
Therefore, they can freely choose which coin to mine for higher
profit, where the profitability depends on both the coin price
and mining difficulty. Some miners can immediately switch the
coin to mine only when mining difficulty changes because the
difficulty changes are more predictable than that for the coin
price, and we call this behavior fickle mining.
In this paper, we study the effects of fickle mining by modeling
a game between two coins. To do this, we consider both fickle
miners and some factions (e.g., BITMAIN for BCH mining) that
stick to mining one coin to maintain that chain. In this model, we
show that fickle mining leads to a Nash equilibrium in which only
a faction sticking to its coin mining remains as a loyal miner to
the less valued coin (e.g., BCH), where loyal miners refer to those
who conduct mining even after coin mining difficulty increases.
This situation would cause severe centralization, weakening the
security of the coin system.
To determine which equilibrium the competing coin systems
(e.g., BTC vs. BCH) are moving toward, we traced the historical
changes of mining power for BTC and BCH and found that BCH
often lacked loyal miners until Nov. 13, 2017, when the difficulty
adjustment algorithm of BCH mining was changed. However, the
change in difficulty adjustment algorithm of BCH mining led to
a state close to the stable coexistence of BTC and BCH. We
also demonstrate that the lack of BCH loyal miners may still be
reached when a fraction of miners automatically and repeatedly
switches to the most profitable coin to mine (i.e., automatic
mining). According to our analysis, as of Dec. 2018, loyal miners
to BCH would leave if more than about 5% of the total mining
capacity for BTC and BCH has engaged in the automatic mining.
In addition, we analyze the recent “hash war” between Bitcoin
ABC and SV, which confirms our theoretical analysis. Finally,
we note that our results can be applied to any competing
cryptocurrency systems in which the same hardware (e.g., ASICs
or GPUs) can be used for mining. Therefore, our study brings
new and important angles in competitive coin markets: a coin
can intentionally weaken the security and decentralization level
of the other rival coin when mining hardware is shared between
them, allowing for automatic mining.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin [1] is the most popular cryptocurrency based on a
distributed and public digital ledger called blockchain. Nodes
in the Bitcoin network store the blockchain, where transactions
are recorded in a unit of a block, and the blockchain is
extended by generating new blocks. The process of generating
new blocks is referred to as mining, and nodes conducting
mining activities are referred to as miners. To successfully
mine, miners should find a solution called the proof-of-work
(PoW) [2]. In Bitcoin, miners are required to solve a crypto-
graphic puzzle finding a hash value to satisfy specific condi-
tions such as a certain number of leading zeroes. To solve a
puzzle, miners spend their computational power, and the miner
who finds the solution obtains 12.5 coins and the transaction
fees in the new block as a reward. In addition, Bitcoin has an
average block interval of 10 minutes by adjusting the mining
difficulty (i.e., the difficulty of the puzzles).
As Bitcoin has gained popularity, the transaction scalability
issue has risen, and several solutions have been proposed to
address the issue. However, there were also several conflicts
over these solutions. As a result, in Aug. 2017, the Bitcoin
system was split into the original Bitcoin (BTC) and Bitcoin
Cash (BCH) [3], [4]. The key idea of BCH is to increase
a maximum block size to process more transactions than
BTC. However, even with different block size limits, they
have compatible proof-of-work mechanisms with each other.
Therefore, miners can freely alternate between BTC and BCH
mining to boost their profits [5]. The mining profitability
changes when the mining difficulty and coin price change,
but some miners may be concerned only with the change in
former because it is relatively easier to predict the former
than the latter. More precisely, rational miners can decide
which cryptocurrency is better to mine depending on the coin
mining difficulty — BCH mining would be conducted by the
miner only if the BCH mining difficulty is low compared to
the BTC mining difficulty; otherwise, the miner does BTC
mining rather than BCH mining. We call this miner’s behavior
“fickle mining” in this paper. Note that the fickle miner may
change the coin to mine at a specific time period whenever
the coin mining difficulty changes. Thus, fickle mining leads
to instability of mining power, which may eventually cause
unstable coin prices [5].
Game model and analysis. In this study, we aim to analyze
the economics of fickle mining rigorously, which can later be
extended to show how one coin can lead to a lack of loyal
miners for other less valued coins. Here, a loyal miner repre-
sents one who conducts mining the less valued coin even after
the coin mining difficulty increases. To study the economics
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of fickle mining, we propose a game theoretical framework
of players who can conduct fickle mining between two coins
(e.g., BTC and BCH). Moreover, our game model reflects
coin factions that stick to mining their own coins, as they are
interested in only the maintenance of their systems rather than
the payoffs. Then we analyze Nash equilibria and dynamics in
the game; two types of equilibria exist: the stable coexistence
of two coins and the lack of loyal miners for the less valued
coin. More specifically, in the latter case, only some factions
(e.g., BITMAIN for BCH mining) remain as loyal miners for
the less valued coin, and this fact can eventually make the
coin system severely centralized, weakening its security. We
describe the game model in Section IV and analyze the game
in Section V.
Data analysis for BTC vs. BCH. Next, as a case study,
we analyzed the mining power changes in BTC and BCH
to see if our theoretical analysis matches with actual mining
power changes. In this paper, we refer to the Bitcoin system
as a coin system consisting of BTC and BCH. We examine
the mining power history in the Bitcoin system from the
release date of BCH until Dec. 2018 to 1) analyze which
equilibrium its state has been moving to and 2) evaluate
our theoretical analysis empirically. Our analysis results show
that until the BCH mining difficulty adjustment algorithm
changed (on Nov. 13, 2017), the Bitcoin state reached a lack
of loyal miners for BCH. Therefore, BCH periodically became
severely centralized before the update of the BCH protocol.
For example, we observe a period when only five miners exist,
of which two miners possess about 70 % power. However,
since Nov. 13, 2017, the Bitcoin state has been close to
coexistence because the change in the BCH mining difficulty
adjustment algorithm with a shorter difficulty adjustment time
interval (i.e., every block) has affected the game as an external
factor.
Nevertheless, we explain that the state would still get closer
to a lack of BCH loyal miners if automatic mining, in which
miners automatically choose the most profitable coin to mine,
is popularly used. Note that the main difference between fickle
mining and automatic mining is that fickle miners immediately
change their coin only when the mining difficulty changes
while automatic miners can immediately change their coin
when not only the mining difficulty but also the coin price
changes. As a result, at the time of writing (Dec. 2018), if
5% of the total mining power of the Bitcoin system involves
automatic mining, the current loyal miners for BCH would
leave, weakening its security.
Data analysis for Bitcoin ABC vs. SV. As another case
study in our game model, we also analyze the changes in
the hash rate distributions of Bitcoin ABC and Bitcoin SV,
before and after the recent “hash war” between those two
coins. The analysis results of these case studies are presented
in Section VI and VII.
Generalization. Moreover, we remark that our analysis can
be generalized to any circumstance wherein two coins have
compatible PoW mechanisms with each other. We believe
that the generalized results bring new important angles in
competitive coin markets; a coin can attempt to steal loyal
miners from other rivalry coins that have compatible PoW
mechanisms. In Section VIII, a risk of automatic mining and
the way to intentionally reduce the number of loyal miners
for other coins are described. Then, in Section IX, we discuss
countermeasures and environmental factors that may make the
actual coin states deviate from our game analysis.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
1) To analyze the economics of fickle mining, we first
model a game between two coins, considering some coin
factions that stick to mining their own coin.
2) We analyze Nash equilibria and dynamics in the game
and find two types of equilibria: 1) stable coexistence of
two coins and 2) a lack of loyal miners to the less valued
coin. Then, we apply this game to the Bitcoin system.
3) To determine if real-world miners’ behaviors follow our
model, we investigate the mining power history in the
Bitcoin system. Then we show that the state reached the
lack of BCH loyal miners until Nov. 13, 2017, and we
confirm that this fact periodically led the BCH system to
be centralized and insecure. Moreover, for generalization,
we also analyze the recent “hash war” situation between
Bitcoin ABC and Bitcoin SV according to our game
model.
4) We introduce a risk of automatic mining and predict that
the current BCH loyal miners would leave when 5%
of the total mining power in BTC and BCH involves
automatic mining.
5) Finally, our game is generalized to any mining-
compatible coins (e.g. Ethereum vs. Ethereum Classic).
Therefore, our study brings a threat that one coin can
intentionally steal loyal miners from other less valued
coin.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Cryptocurrency
Many cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and
Litecoin adopt the PoW mechanism as a consensus algorithm.
In the PoW mechanism, when a node solves a cryptographic
puzzle, the node can generate and propagate a valid block.
Then other nodes append the generated block to the existing
blockchain. The puzzle is to find an inverse image of a hash
function satisfying the certain condition, and thus the node
should spend computational power to solve the cryptographic
puzzle. The process of generating a block is called mining, and
nodes participating in mining are called miners. In systems,
the mining difficulty is adjusted to maintain the average time
of generating one block. In particular, Bitcoin mining difficulty
is adjusted to keep the average period of generating one block
at 10 minutes. In addition, to incentivize mining, whenever a
miner finds a valid block, the miner earns the reward for one
block in compensation for the computational power spent. For
example, currently, miners earn the block reward of 12.5 coins
in the Bitcoin system when they find one block.
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Many people have become involved in mining because
of the incentive for mining, and specialized hardware for
efficient mining such as application-specific integrated circuits
(ASICs) has appeared. Based on the above reasons, the vast
computational power is used for mining, and mining difficulty
has increased significantly. Therefore, it should take a solo
miner, who mines alone, a significantly long time to find a
valid block, and this causes solo miners to wait for a long time
to earn block rewards. To reduce not only node costs and but
also the variance of their rewards, mining pools where miners
gather together for mining have been organized. Most pools
are composed of workers and a manager. The manager gives
puzzles to workers, and they solve the puzzles. If a worker
solves a given puzzle, the block reward is distributed to the
workers in the pool.
In the past years, there have been many attacks on and
problems with cryptocurrency systems, and these attacks or
problems have even caused cryptocurrency systems to split.
For example, because Bitcoin has become a popular cryptocur-
rency, the system needs to provide high transaction throughput.
To address the scalability issue, several solutions such as
Segregated Witness [6] and unlimited block size have been
proposed. Because of the debate on the proposed solutions,
Bitcoin was eventually split into BTC and BCH in early Aug.
2017. Even though BCH chose to increase the block size limit
in order to allow more transactions per block, the mining
protocol of BCH was designed to be compatible with that
of BTC. Therefore, miners can conduct both BTC and BCH
mining with one hardware device.
B. Fickle mining
Before Nov. 13, 2017, BCH adjusted the mining difficulty
every 2016 block to ensure that the average time period for
generating a block is 10 minutes, like in the case of BTC. In
doing so, if the time required for generating past 2016 blocks
is longer than two weeks, the mining difficulty decreases,
and miners can generate subsequent blocks more easily. In
addition, BCH added a new difficulty adjustment algorithm
called emergency difficulty adjustment (EDA) [7] to decrease
the mining difficulty without waiting for 2016 blocks to be
generated when it is significantly difficult to find a valid block.
Because BTC and BCH have a PoW mechanism compatible
with each other, miners can freely switch between them de-
pending on the mining difficulty and the coin price. However,
because the change in coin price is hard to predict, some min-
ers immediately change their coin only when mining difficulty
changes, where we call this behavior fickle mining. Concretely,
the fickle miners first conduct BTC mining, observing the
changes in the mining difficulties of BTC and BCH. Then,
if the BCH mining difficulty is low, they immediately shift
to BCH mining. When the BCH mining difficulty increases
again thanks to its difficulty adjustment algorithm, fickle
miners immediately shift to BTC mining. Fickle mining can
boost profits of miners; however, this behavior might cause
instability of both BTC and BCH.
This mining behavior was easily observed in Bitcoin when
we monitored the mining power in pools. We collected mining
power history data over the course of a week from two
popular pools: ViaBTC [8] and BTC.com [9]. These two pools
support both BTC and BCH mining; miners in the pools can
choose either BTC or BCH mining by just clicking one button.
Figure 1 represents the mining power data of ViaBTC and
BTC.com for a week. In the figure, the grey regions show
movements of mining power from BTC to BCH mining.
Figure 1. Mining power history of ViaBTC and BTC.com (Sep. 29, 2017 ∼
Oct. 6, 2017). The grey regions represent movements of mining power from
BTC to BCH.
Figure 2. Mining power history of ViaBTC (Dec. 5, 2017 ∼ Dec. 8, 2017).
Grey regions represent movements of mining power from BTC to BCH. Note
that we only displayed the mining power history of ViaBTC because BTC.com
did not evidently execute fickle mining for this period.
As fickle mining causes a sudden increase in mining power
as shown in the grey zones of Figure 1, many blocks were
generated quite quickly in the BCH system. For example, in
the BCH system, 2016 blocks were generated within only
three days in each grey zone. This caused the blockchain
of BCH to be thousands of blocks ahead of BTC, and the
halving time of the block reward in BCH was brought forward.
To address this issue, BCH performed another hard fork on
Nov. 13, 2017 [10]. Currently, BCH adjusts the difficulty for
each block based on the previous 144 blocks as a moving
window [11]. To determine if it is possible that miners conduct
fickle mining even after the hard fork of Nov. 13, 2017, we
investigated the BCH mining power data of ViaBTC for four
days (Dec. 5, 2017 ∼ Dec. 8, 2017). Figure 2 represents the
BCH mining power data of ViaBTC during this time period;
as is evident from the figure, some miners still conduct fickle
mining. Because the BCH mining difficulty is more quickly
adjusted than before the hard fork of BCH, fickle miners
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should switch their mining power more quickly than before
the hard fork. Indeed, fickle mining can occur in any mining
difficulty adjustment algorithm.
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review previous studies related to mining
in PoW systems. Kroll et al. considered the Bitcoin mining
process as a game among multiple players [12] and showed
that a miner possessing 51% mining power can be motivated to
disrupt the Bitcoin system. Several works [13], [14] modeled
and analyzed a game between two pools that can launch
denial of service attacks against each other. Eyal and Sirer
introduced the selfish mining strategy, where a malicious miner
successfully mines blocks but does not immediately broadcast
the blocks; instead, the attacker temporarily withholds the
block [15]. Many researchers have intensively studied ways
to optimize and extend selfish mining [16], [17], [18], [19].
Bonneau introduced bribery attacks as a way for an attacker to
increase her mining power [20]. Lewenberg et al. considered
a mechanism of sharing rewards among pool miners as a
cooperative game [21]. In 2015, Eyal modeled a game between
two pools that execute block withholding (BWH) attacks [22].
As a concurrent work, Luu et al. [23] modeled a power
splitting game to find an optimized strategy for a BWH
attacker. Kwon et al. [24] proposed a new attack called a
fork after withholding (FAW) attack against pools [24]. Also,
several works [25], [26] analyzed a transaction-fee regime in
PoW systems, where miners receive incentives for mining as
transaction fees. Moreover, because many cryptocurrencies are
competing with each other, there can be another incentive to
execute 51% attacks. Considering this fact, Bonneau revisited
the 51% attack with some basic analysis [27].
Recently, Ma et al. [28] considered a mining game of
multiple miners and concluded that openness of the Bitcoin
system causes the need for vast mining power. Another
study [29] examined the relation between the Bitcoin/USD
exchange rate and Bitcoin mining power. They first proposed
an industry equilibrium model to forecast the mining power
depending on the Bitcoin/USD exchange rate. Then, they
showed that the real mining power data and simulated mining
power according to their model are similar. Our study focuses
on the relation between two coins that have compatible PoW
mechanisms with each other and the miners’ behavior between
two coins. Furthermore, our model can be used to forecast
the ratio of mining power between two coins. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first to study the effects of fickle
mining.
IV. MODEL
In this section, we formally model a game to represent fickle
mining between two coins.
A. Notation and assumptions
We consider two coins, coinA and coinB, which have
compatible PoW mechanisms with each other. In this case, a
miner with a hardware device can alternately conduct mining
of coinA and coinB; that is, he can conduct fickle mining
between them. Meanwhile, a coinB-faction can stick to coinB-
mining rather than fickle mining or coinA-mining to maintain
its own coin, and the set of coinB-factions sticking to coinB-
mining is denoted by Ωstick. For example, in the case where
BCH is coinB, BITMAIN [30], one of the main supporters
of BCH, may belong to Ωstick. We aim to formalize a game
considering the fickle mining and Ωstick.
The proposed game consists of many players (i.e., min-
ers), where the set of all players is denoted by Ω. Player
i ∈ Ω chooses one of three strategies, si ∈ {F ,A,B}:
Fickle mining (F), coinA-only mining (A), and coinB-only
mining (B). The payoff function of player i is denoted by
Ui : {F ,A,B}n → R, which we will formally define later
as well as fickle mining. We also define three sets MF
= {i ∈ Ω |si = F}, MA = {i ∈ Ω |si = A}, and
MB = {i ∈ Ω |si = B}, indicating a set of players who
conduct fickle mining, coinA-only mining, and coinB-only
mining, respectively. Note that Ωstick is a subset of MB
because players in Ωstick always choose strategy B. The sum
of mining powers in coinA and coinB is regarded as 1; mining
power of a coin is expressed as a ratio to the total mining
power. The mining power possessed by player i is denoted
by ci, and the total computational power possessed by Ωstick
is denoted by cstick. We also define cmax as the maximum
of {ci | i ∈ Ω\Ωstick}. Moreover, because our game analysis
result would depend on the computational power possessed by
players, we use the notation G(c, cstick) to refer to the game,
where c indicates a vector of computational power possessed
by players except for Ωstick (i.e., c = (ci)i∈Ω\Ωstick). Lastly,
we denote the total mining power of MF , MA, and MB
as rF (i.e.,
∑
i∈MF ci), rA (i.e.,
∑
i∈MA ci), and rB (i.e.,∑
i∈MB ci), respectively. Observe that rA = 1− rF − rB and
cstick ≤ rB. Namely, (rF , rB) represents the full status of
mining powers where rB is not less than cstick.
For the analysis of the game, we assume the following:
Assumption 1. A miner conducts either only coinA or coinB-
mining (not both) at each time instance; for example, an ASIC
miner cannot execute both BTC and BCH mining simultane-
ously. However, their choices can be time-varying; that is,
miners can change their coin to mine.
Assumption 2. The price of 1 coinB is equal to that of k
coinA. We assume that 0 < k ≤ 1 without loss of generality.
In addition, rewards for mining a block in both coins are 1
coinA and 1 coinB, respectively.
Assumption 3. In both coinA and coinB systems, mining
difficulties are adjusted to maintain the average period of
generating a block as the same specific time period, which we
denote by 1 Pag time and regard as a time unit; for example, 1
Pag = 10 minutes in the Bitcoin system. Furthermore, we con-
sider a generalized model in which mining difficulties of coinA
and coinB are adjusted in proportion to the mining power
for the previous time window, and we consider a normalized
difficulty. Thus, if x mining power has been engaged in coin
mining, the mining difficulty would be x. More precisely, in
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Figure 3. Changes in the mining power of coinA and coinB, and mining
difficulty of coinB.
our model, the coin mining difficulty decreases and increases
again, considering the generation time of a specific number
of blocks since the last update of coin mining difficulty. In
particular, for the mining difficulty of coinB, we denote the
number of considered blocks when the coinB-mining difficulty
decreases and increases as Nde and Nin, respectively.1 Note
that Nde and Nin cannot be zero. In the case of BTC and
Litecoin, Nde and Nin are 2016.
As described previously, a fickle miner may change the
preferred coin when the coin mining difficulty changes. Here
we define fickle mining formally.
Definition IV.1 (Fickle mining). Let DA and DB denote the
coinA and coinB-mining difficulties, respectively. If DB <
min{rF + rB, k · DA} or DB ≤ rB when DA or DB is
updated, fickle miners (MF ) decide to conduct coinB-mining
until DA or DB is adjusted again. Otherwise, they conduct
coinA-mining.
We also emphasize that if rF is 0, no miner engages in fickle
mining, and mining powers of coinA and coinB are stably
maintained. On the other hand, if rB is cstick, only coinB-
factions Ωstick would conduct coinB-mining after an increase
in the mining difficulty of coinB. In other words, in this case,
only the factions remain as loyal miners for coinB. Therefore,
if the number of such factions (|Ωstick|) is small, the state
would be a lack of loyal miners. Note that loyal miners refer
to players who continue to conduct coinB-mining even after
an increase in coinB-mining. In particular, if all coinB-factions
stop coinB-mining for higher payoff (i.e., |Ωstick| = 0), rB is
0, and no player conducts coinB-mining after an increase in
the mining difficulty of coinB. Note that the coinB-mining
difficulty cannot decrease in this case because Nde cannot
be zero. Therefore, the case rB = 0 indicates the complete
downfall of coinB while only coinA survives.
Parameters used in this paper are summarized in Table I.
The last parameter in the table will be introduced later.
Illustration of fickle mining. Figure 3 illustrates a stream
of mining power in coinA and coinB, as well as the mining
1In Section VI, we will show that our results can be applied to the coin
system regardless of the mining difficulty adjustment algorithm of coinB.
Table I
LIST OF PARAMETERS.
Ωstick
The set of coinB-factions sticking to coinB
mining to maintain their own coin
Ω The set of all players
si Player i’s strategy
Ui Player i’s payoff
F , A, B Fickle, coinA-only, coinB-only mining
MF , MA, MB The set of players with F , A, B
ci Computational power of player i
cstick Computational power possessed by Ωstick
cmax The maximum of {ci | i ∈ Ω\Ωstick}
c
The vector of computational power
possessed by players in Ω\Ωstick
G(c, cstick) The game of players and Ωstick withcomputational power c and cstick
rF , rA, rB The total computational powerfraction of MF , MA, MB
k The relative price of coinB to coinA
Pag
The time unit representing the average
period of generating one block
Nde, Nin
The number of considered past blocks when the
mining difficulty of coinB decreases or increases
DA, DB The mining difficulty of coinA, coinB
E(c, cstick) The set of all Nash equilibrium in G(c, cstick)
difficulty of coinB over time, caused by the strategies of
players.
- Time t0 : At the beginning, 1 − rB and rB mining powers
are used for coinA and coinB-mining, respectively.
- Time t1 : The mining difficulty of coinB decreases because
it is relatively difficult to find PoWs with rB mining power.
At the moment, MF shifts from coinA to coinB, and each of
1 − rF − rB and rF + rB mining powers is used for coinA
and coinB-mining, respectively.
- Time t2 : Because the mining difficulty of coinB is again
adjusted (increases) after Nin blocks are found in the coinB
system since the last adjustment of the mining difficulty of
coinB, the mining difficulty of coinB would increase after
NinrB
rF+rB
Pag time since it takes rBrF+rB Pag to find one valid
block on average. Then,MF shifts again from coinB to coinA
and conducts coinA-mining until the mining difficulty of coinB
decreases.
- Time t3 : Until when the mining difficulty of coinB decreases
after Nde blocks are found in the coinB system, MF would
conduct coinA-mining (for
Nde(rF+rB)
rB
Pag time).
- This process is continually repeated.
B. Payoff function
Next, we describe payoff functions for our game model. All
payoffs are expressed as a unit of coinA and are calculated as
a profit density, which is defined as an average earned reward
for 1 Pag time divided by the player’s mining power. In other
words, if player i earns a reward R for 1 Pag time on average,
the payoff would be Rci . Player i’s payoff function Ui(si, s−i)
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is expressed as follows:
Ui(si, s−i) =

UF (rF , rB) if si = F
UA(rF , rB) if si = A
UB(rF , rB) if si = B
(1)
where s−i indicates other players’ strategies. Here, it suffices
to define UF , UA, UB in the range 0 < rF ≤ 1, 0 < rA ≤ 1,
and 0 < rB ≤ 1, respectively; for example, UF would be
defined when si = F (i.e, a fickle miner exists, and 0 < rF ).
First, we define the payoff UF for a player in MF . As
shown in Figure 3,MF conducts coinB-mining for NinrBrF+rB Pag
time. Therefore, a player inMF earns the profit k·cirB per 1 Pag
time on average for NinrBrF+rB Pag time. After that,MF conducts
coinA-mining for
Nde(rF+rB)
rB
Pag time during which a player
in MF earns the following profit per 1 Pag time on average:
APF := ci
NinrB
rF+rB +
Nde(rF+rB)
rB
(1−rF−rB) NinrBrF+rB +(1−rB)
Nde(rF+rB)
rB
. (2)
The above formulation is due to the fact that mining powers
1−rF−rB and 1−rB engage in coinA-mining for NinrBrF+rB Pag
and Nde(rF+rB)rB Pag times, respectively, and thus, the second
factor in the right-hand side of (2) represents an inverse
number of the mining difficulty of coinA. Consequently, the
payoff of a player in MF can be expressed as
UF (rF , rB) =
(
k·ci
rB
· NinrBrF+rB + APF ×
Nde(rF+rB)
rB
)
× Z,
where
Z =
1
ci
(
NinrB
rF+rB
+ Nde(rF+rB)rB
) .
Next, we provide payoffs UA and UB as follows:
UA(rF , rB) =
APF
ci
,
UB(rF , rB) =
(
kNin
rF + rB
+
kNde
rB
)
× ci · Z,
where we observe that a player in MB earns the profit k·cirB
per 1 Pag for NinrBrF+rB Pag time and profit
k·ci
rF+rB
per 1 Pag for
Nde(rF+rB)
rB
Pag time, on average.
V. GAME ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze Nash equilibria and dynamics in
game G(c, cstick).
A. Equilibrium in game G(c, cstick)
Characterization of equilibria. Before finding Nash equilib-
ria of G(c, cstick), we define a pure Nash equilibrium.
Definition V.1 (Pure Nash equilibrium). A strategy vector s =
(s1, s2, · · · sn) is a Nash equilibrium if
Ui(s) = max
s′i∈{F,A,B}
Ui(s
′
i, s−i), for all i.
At an equilibrium, all rational players would not change their
strategy, that is, rF and rB are not updated. We map a strategy
vector s = (s1, s2, · · · sn) to state (rF , rB) and denote by
E(c, cstick) the set of all Nash equilibria in G(c, cstick). We
first determine the dynamics of player i with small ci through
Lemma V.1 to establish the characterization of E(c, cstick).
Lemma V.1. There is ε > 0 such that, any player i possessing
ci < ε does not change its strategy at state (rF , rB) if and
only if
(rF , rB) =
{
(fε(cstick), cstick) ifcstick > 0,
(k2 +
√
Nde2k2+4NdeNin(k·ci−c2i )
2Nde
≤ rF ≤ 1, 0) otherwise,
where fε is a decreasing function of which input is cstick and
output ranges between 0 and 1 − cstick. Parameters k,Nde,
and Nin are defined in Assumption 2 and 3.
Note that fε(cstick) is 1 − cstick for a small value of cstick
while fε(cstick) is 0 for a large value of cstick. The above
lemma implies that, considering miners with small computa-
tional power, if a Nash equilibrium exists, only Ωstick would
remain as loyal miners to coinB in the equilibrium. This is
because (rF , rB) would continually change when rB is greater
than cstick. From Lemma V.1, we can characterize the set
E(c, cstick) as stated in Theorem V.2. We present the proof of
Lemma V.1 and Theorem V.2 in Appendix A.
Theorem V.2. There is ε > 0 such that, when cmax < ε, the
set E(c, cstick) is as follows.
E(c, cstick) =

{(rF , rB) : X ≤ rF ≤ 1, rB = 0} ifcstick = 0,
{(1− cstick, cstick)} else ifcstick < x,
{(0, cstick)} else ifcstick > y,
where
X = max
i∈Ω\Ωstick
k2 +
√
Nde
2k2 + 4NdeNin(k · ci − c2i )
2Nde
 ,
x and y (> x) range between 0 and 1.
As described above, Theorem V.2 shows that, in a game
where players except for Ωstick possess small computational
power, there exist only Nash equilibria where the coinB-
factions sticking to coinB-mining are loyal miners for coinB.
In the case where cstick is small, we can certainly see that
the overall health of the coinB system would be weakened in
terms of scalability, decentralization, and security, which will
be discussed in more detail in Section VII-A. Indeed, even
if cstick is large, the case where rB is equal to cstick would
make the coinB system significantly centralized because only
a few players possessing large power are loyal miners to coinB
(this example is presented in Section VII-B). In particular, if
Ωstick is empty, no miner exists in the coinB system in all
Nash equilibria. Remark that this case indicates the complete
downfall of coinB . As a result, Theorem V.2 implies that fickle
mining can be dangerous.
When players possess infinitesimal mining power. Under
the game G(c, cstick), it is not easy to analyze movement of
state (rF , rB) (this movement will be used for data analysis in
Section VII) due to a large degree of freedom in c. Thus, we
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further assume that players except for Ωstick (i.e., Ω\Ωstick)
possess infinitesimal computational power (i.e., ‖c‖2 ≈ 0).
We show that this assumption is reasonable by analyzing the
real-world dataset in the Bitcoin system (see Section VI). We
again study the equilibria of G(c, cstick) in this case.
Theorem V.3. When players except for Ωstick possess in-
finitesimal mining power, the set E(c, cstick) is as follows.
E(c, cstick) =
{(
0, kk+1
)}
∪ {(rF , rB) : k ≤ rF ≤ 1, rB = 0}
if cstick = 0 (Case 1),{(
0, kk+1
)}
∪ {(1− cstick, cstick)}
else if cstick ≤ α (Case 2),{(
0, kk+1
)}
∪ {(β, cstick)}
else if α < cstick ≤ kk+1 (Case 3),
{(0, cstick)} otherwise (Case 4)
(3)
Here, α and β are defined in Section V-B.
We present the proof of Theorem V.3 in Appendix B. Compar-
ing with Theorem V.2, the state (0, kk+1 ) also becomes another
Nash equilibrium when the computational power possessed by
players (except for Ωstick) is infinitesimal. Note that this state
indicates the stable coexistence of coinA and coinB. Indeed,
when ‖c‖2 is closer to 0, the difference among payoffs of
players in MF , MA, and MB would also be closer to 0 at
the state (0, kk+1 ). Therefore, under the assumption that players
possess infinitesimal power, payoffs of players in MF , MA,
and MB are the same at the state (0, kk+1 ) while the mining
difficulties of coinA and coinB are maintained as 1k+1 and
k
k+1 ,
respectively. Meanwhile, at the remaining equilibria except
for the state (0, kk+1 ), only the coinB-factions Ωstick conduct
coinB-mining after the coinB-mining difficulty increases. In
particular, if no coinB-faction sticking to coinB-mining exists,
loyal mining power to coinB is 0 in the Nash equilibria.
Note that, in this case, MF and MA would continuously
conduct coinA-mining, because the mining difficulty of coinB
has not decreased after the previous increase in difficulty.
These players would not also change their strategy because
the mining difficulty of coinB increases to a significantly high
value due to the heavy occurrence of fickle mining.
Example. Considering the case cstick = 0, we give an
example where (rF = 0.2, rB = 0), k = 0.3, and the initial
mining difficulty of coinB is 0.4. The state (0.2, 0) is not a
Nash equilibrium according to Theorem V.3. Because fickle
miners continuously conduct the coinA-mining, the mining
difficulty of coinA is maintained as 1, and players inMF and
MA earn the payoff of 1. If a player moves into MB, the
player would earn 0.30.4 for a while in the beginning. However,
because the mining difficulty of coinB decreases after MB
finds several blocks, the player who moves to MB would
eventually earn 0.30.2 consistently. Note that the time duration in
which the mining difficulty of coinB is close to 0 is negligible
compared to the time duration in which the mining difficulty of
Figure 4. Horizontal and vertical axes give the values of rF and rB ,
respectively, and (rF , rB)-coordinates of vertices in zones are marked. At the
vertex of Zone1 and Zone3, α is a solution of equation Ninr3B+NderB(1+
k)− kNde = 0 for rB . All points in Zone1, Zone2, and Zone3 move in
directions (−,−), (−,+), and (+,−), respectively.
Figure 5. Yellow points and line represent equilibria for each case.
coinB is 0.2. Therefore, the payoff ofMB is 0.30.2 , and rational
players tend to move to MB due to the higher payoff. This
means that the state (0.2, 0) is not a Nash equilibrium.
B. Dynamics in game G(c, cstick)
In this section, we analyze dynamics in the game
G(c, cstick) and study how a state can reach an equilibrium.
Best response dynamics. In game G(c, cstick), point (rF , rB)
reaches either of the two types of Nash equilibria: the stable
coexistence of two coins and the lack of loyal miners to coinB .
Figure 4 represents dynamics in game G(c, cstick), where
horizontal and vertical axes are rF and rB values, respectively.
A line, boundary1,3, represents
rB
(1− rF − rB)Ninr2B + (1− rB)Nde(rF + rB)2
=
k
Ninr2B +Nde(rF + rB)2
.
(4)
On the line, the payoffs of MF (i.e., UF (rF , rB)) and MA
(i.e., UA(rF , rB)) are the same. In addition, the line does not
intersect with the line (0 ≤ rF ≤ 1, rB = 0) and has an
intersection (1 − α, α) with the line rF + rB = 1 for 0 ≤
rF ≤ 1, where α is a solution of equation Ninr3B+NderB(1+
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k)−kNde = 0 for rB. The equation Ninr3B+NderB(1 +k)−
kNde = 0 has only one solution α, and it is between 0 and
k
1+k . Another line, boundary2,3, represents
(rF + rB)
(1− rF − rB)Ninr2B + (1− rB)Nde(rF + rB)2
=
k
Ninr2B +Nde(rF + rB)2
,
(5)
and the payoffs of MF (i.e., UF ) and MB (i.e., UB) are the
same on the line. The line does not intersect with the line
rF + rB = 1 for 0 ≤ rF ≤ 1 and has an intersection (k, 0)
with the line (0 ≤ rF ≤ 1, rB = 0). Moreover, it is most
profitable among the three strategies to continually conduct
coinA-mining (A) in a zone above boundary1,3. We let this
zone be Zone1. In the zone below boundary2,3, it is most
profitable to continually conduct coinB-mining (B), and the
zone is denoted as Zone2. In the zone between boundary1,3
and boundary2,3, fickle mining (F) is the most profitable,
and this zone is denoted as Zone3. Note that the range of
zones changes if the coin price changes because boundaries
are functions of k.
The moving direction of point (rF , rB) is expressed as a red
arrow in Figure 4. For ease of reading, we express directions
in which values rF and rB increase (+) or decrease (−) as
(±,±). For example, (+,+) indicates the direction in which
both values, rF and rB, increase. In Zone1, A is the most
profitable strategy, and thus every point in Zone1 moves in the
direction (−,−). In Zone2, because B is the most profitable
strategy, every point moves in the direction (−,+). Finally,
in Zone3, as F is the most profitable strategy, every point
in Zone3 moves in the direction (+,−). Figure 4 shows the
directions in the three zones (Zone1, Zone2, and Zone3).
2D-Illustration of movement towards equilibria. To deter-
mine which equilibrium can be reached within each zone, we
represent all Nash equilibria in game G(c, cstick) depending
on a value of cstick as yellow points and line in Figure 5.
In the figure, the red dash lines represent rB = cstick
for each case. As described in Section V-A, there are two
types of equilibrium points: 1) a lack of loyal miners and
2) stable coexistence of two coins. The equilibrium point
representing a lack of loyal miners would be located on a
red dash line rB = cstick, and we can see that all cases
have this equilibrium. For Cases 1, 2, and 3, the second type
of equilibrium (i.e., (0, kk+1 )) representing stable coexistence
of two coins is also found. A point (rF , rB) moves in the
direction depending on its zone. In the meantime, if the point
meets the line rB = cstick, then the point moves toward
an equilibrium located on the line rB = cstick as shown in
Figure 5. In particular, the value of rF in the equilibrium on
the red dash line representing Case 3 is denoted by β, where
the equilibrium is the intersection point between boundary1,3
and the red dash line. Note, a point in Zone2 would not meet
a red dash line because the point in Zone2 moves in the
direction (−,+) and can always be above the red dash line.
Therefore, such points in Zone2 are likely to reach the stable
coexistence of coinA and coinB. However, some points (near
to boundary2,3) in Zone2 can also move into Zone3 when
more miners of MA than that of MF revise their strategies,
and then it is possible to reach the equilibrium, representing
a lack of loyal miners to coinB.
VI. APPLICATION TO BITCOIN SYSTEM
In this section, we apply our game model to Bitcoin as a
case study. Specifically, we consider game G(c, cstick) when
players possess sufficiently small mining power. To see if this
assumption is reasonable, we investigate the mining power
distribution in the Bitcoin system, referring to the power dis-
tribution provided by Slush [31]. The distribution is depicted
in Figure 6 where the x-axis represents the range of the relative
computational power ci and the y-axis represents the number
of miners possessing computational power in the correspond-
ing range. The figure shows that 1) most miners possess
sufficiently small mining power, and 2) even the maximum
computational power is less than 10−2. Note that BITMAIN’s
ci is about 3 · 10−2 as of Dec. 2018. Moreover, even though
mining pools currently possess large computational power, the
miners in pools can individually decide which coin to mine.
We also recognize the distribution of computational power is
significantly biased toward a few miners, as shown in Figure 6.
However, this fact does not imply that ‖c‖2 is large. Referring
to the data provided by Slush, ‖c‖2 is only about 0.05, where
this value is equivalent to that for the case where all miners
possess 2.5 × 10−3 computational power.2 Therefore, most
miners (and most mining power) would follow dynamics of
game G(c, cstick). As a result, we can apply game G(c, cstick)
to the practical systems.
Figure 6. The computational power distribution in Slush.
Now, we describe how game G(c, cstick) is applied to the
Bitcoin system. As described in Section II, Bitcoin was split
into BTC and BCH in Aug. 2017. Thus, we can map BTC
and BCH to coinA and coinB, respectively. For the mining
difficulty adjustment algorithm of BCH, we should consider
two types of BCH mining difficulty adjustment algorithms:
those that BCH have before and after Nov. 13, 2017. This is
because the mining difficulty adjustment algorithm of BCH
changed through a hard fork of BCH (on Nov. 13, 2017).
2We calculated this assuming that other pools have the computational power
distribution similar to Slush.
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Before Nov. 13, 2017. First, we consider the mining difficulty
adjustment algorithm of BCH before Nov. 13, 2017. In this
algorithm, not only the mining difficulty is adjusted for every
2016 block, but also EDA can occur as described in Section II.
Note that EDA occurs if the mining is significantly difficult
in comparison with the current mining power, i.e., EDA is
used only for decreasing the BCH mining difficulty. Therefore,
the value of Nin is 2016 because the BCH mining difficulty
can increase after 2016 blocks are found. Meanwhile, when
the BCH mining difficulty decreases, the value of Nde varies
depending on rF and rB, ranging between 6 and 2016. Thus,
we can consider the expected number of blocks found until
the mining difficulty decreases (i.e, the mean of Nde denoted
by E[Nde]) instead of Nde, and E[Nde] as a function of rF
and rB would continuously vary from 6 to 2016. If rF is 0,
E[Nde] is 2016 because EDA does not occur, and if rB is 0,
E[Nde] is 6.
As a result, the Bitcoin system before Nov. 13, 2017 can
be G(c, cstick) where E[Nde] substitutes for Nde. This game
G(c, cstick) has also Nash equilibria and dynamics as shown
in Figure 4 because E[Nde] is a continuous function of rF
and rB.
After Nov. 13, 2017. Next, we consider the Bitcoin system
after Nov. 13, 2017. In this case, the BCH mining difficulty
adjustment algorithm is different from that assumed in our
game because the mining difficulty is adjusted for every block
by considering the generation time of the past 144 blocks as a
moving time window. Despite that, game G(c, cstick) can be
applied to this system. Indeed, in general, our results for game
G(c, cstick) would appear in the Bitcoin system regardless of
the BCH mining difficulty adjustment algorithm, shown below.
Theorem VI.1. Consider the game G(c, cstick) when ‖c‖2 ≈
0. Then when the mining difficulty of coinB is adjusted every
block or in a short time period, the set E(c, cstick) is (3)
presented in Theorem V.3. In addition, G(c, cstick) under this
mining difficulty adjustment algorithm of coinB has dynamics
such as in Figure 4.
Because the current BCH mining difficulty is adjusted every
block, Theorem VI.1 implies that results for game G(c, cstick)
is also applied to the current Bitcoin system even though
the BCH mining difficulty adjustment algorithm changed. The
proof of Theorem VI.1 is presented in Appendix C.
VII. DATA ANALYSIS
A. BTC vs. BCH
We analyze the mining power data in the Bitcoin system
to identify to which equilibrium the state has been moving.
Moreover, through this data analysis, we can find out empir-
ically how much our theoretical model agrees with practical
results. For data analysis of the Bitcoin system, we collected
the mining power data of BTC and BCH from the release date
of BCH (Aug. 1, 2017) until the time of writing (Dec. 10,
2018) from CoinWarz [32]. Figure 7a represents the mining
power history of BCH, where the mining power is expressed
as a fraction of the total power in BTC and BCH, i.e.,
BCH mining power
BTC mining power + BCH mining power
.
In addition, we represent the data history of a ratio between
difficulties of BCH and BTC (i.e., DBDA ) and a relative price
of BCH to that for BTC (i.e., k) in Figure 7b and 7c,
respectively. The price of BCH is depicted as a yellow line in
Figure 7c (see the left y-axis). Moreover, Figure 7c represents
the relative BCH mining profitability (kDADB − 1) to the BTC
mining profitability as a purple line, and the black dashed
line represents kDADB − 1 = 0 (see the right y-axis for the two
lines). For this profitability, to increase reliability of data, we
collected the daily BCH profitability from CoinDance [33],
and thus a purple point is a data captured every day. Note
that DBDA is less than k in the case where the purple line is
above the black dashed line. Figure 7d simultaneously shows
all data histories (except for the BCH mining profitability)
presented in Figure 7a∼7c. In Figure 7, the data from Dec.
2017 to Nov. 2018 are omitted because they are similar to the
data for Dec. 2018. Figure 8a∼8i correspond to parts (1)∼(9)
of Figure 7, respectively, where the area of three zones has
changed because the relative price k of BCH to that for BTC
has fluctuated quite frequently.
As another case study, we examine the mining power data
of Bitcoin ABC and Bitcoin SV from Nov. 1, 2018 to Dec.
20, 2018 to analyze a special situation where cstick suddenly
increases due to the “hash war” caused by a hard fork in the
BCH system. We describe this in Section VII-B.
Methodology. We first describe how to determine rF and rB
of each state. According to the definition of fickle mining
(Definition IV.1), fickle miners would conduct BCH mining
from when DBDA changes to a value less than k to when
DB
DA
changes to a value greater than k. This is because DB is
always less than rF + rB and greater than rB (see Figure 7d).
Therefore, Figure 7a represents the value of rF+rB during the
period. We indicate the fickle mining periods in gray before
the hard fork of BCH (Nov. 13, 2017) in Figure 7. Figure 7d
shows that DBDA changes to a value less than and greater than k
at the start and end of these periods, respectively. As a result,
in Figure 7a, we can find out the value of rF+rB for the gray
colored periods and the value of rB for non-colored periods.
Here, we can see that the mining power of BCH has fluctuated
considerably when the ratio of the BCH mining difficulty to
the BTC mining difficulty (DBDA ) changes to a value less than
k. Moreover, when the coin mining difficulties do not change
while BCH mining is more profitable than BTC mining, large
peaks (i.e., a sudden increase) do not appear. This fact is
confirmed, referring to the purple line in non-colored zones
(e.g., part (3) in Figure 7c). As a result, we can consider that
those fluctuations occur due to fickle miners between BTC and
BCH.
If a miner switches the coin to mine without changes in the
coin mining difficulty, this implies that the miner’s strategy
changes (e.g., fromA to B). From the method described above,
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 7. The data for the Bitcoin system from early Aug. 2017 to Dec. 2018 is represented. Figure 7a, 7b, and 7c represent (a) relative mining power of
BCH to the total mining power, (b) the ratio between mining difficulties of BCH and BTC, (c) the ratio between prices of BCH and BTC, and BCH mining
profitability. Figure 7d shows the data for mining power, price, and mining difficulty of BCH. In the gray zones, fickle miners conduct BCH mining. The data
from Dec. 2017 to Nov. 2018 are omitted because they are similar to the data for Dec. 2018. Each point represents a data captured every hour.
(a) Figure 7-(1) (b) Figure 7-(2) (c) Figure 7-(3)
(d) Figure 7-(4) (e) Figure 7-(5) (f) Figure 7-(6)
(g) Figure 7-(7) (h) Figure 7-(8) (i) Figure 7-(9)
Figure 8. Points and movements of Figure 7. Figure 8a ∼ 8i correspond to parts (1)∼(9) in Figure 7. Red arrows represent movement in agreement with
our model, whereas black arrows represent movement deviating from our model. Each upper right square presents enlarged points and directions.
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we can determine the mining power rF used for fickle mining
and the mining power rB used for BCH-only mining. The
points and directions are marked roughly in Figure 8. The red
arrow represents movement in agreement with our analysis,
whereas the black arrow represents movement deviating from
our analysis.
Next, we explain Figure 8 by matching it with each part of
Figure 7.
The beginning of the game. In Figure 7-(1), the status point
is initially in Zone1, and then it moves to Zone2 as shown
in Figure 8a, as the BCH mining power decreases.
Towards the lack of BCH loyal miners. In Figure 7a-(2),
two peaks occur when the BCH mining difficulty decreases
to values less than k, and these peaks appear in the gray
colored periods. Therefore, we can know that these peaks
occur due to fickle miners. The first peak indicates that more
and more miners started fickle mining (i.e., increase in rF ).
This is because the upflow of the first peak is less steep than
that for other peaks, and the downflow of the first peak is
steeper than the upflow of the first peak, indicating that rF
increases from near 0 up to near 0.4. Furthermore, one can see
that rB increased at the beginning of Figure 7a-(2). Remark
that Figure 7a shows the value of rB in a non-colored zone.
In addition, the BCH mining power in the valley between
two peaks of Figure 7a-(2) is greater than the mining power
at the end of Figure 7a-(1). This fact shows again that rB
increased at the beginning of Figure 7a-(2). After that, because
the end of Figure 7a-(2) is less than the valley between the
two peaks of Figure 7a-(2), we can know that rB decreased
while rF increased in Figure 7a-(2). Figure 8b represents these
movements described above.
In the beginning of Figure 7a-(3), rB slightly increases,
and it does not correspond with our model; we regard this
as a momentary phenomenon because of a decrease in the
BCH mining difficulty. Figure 7b shows that the BCH mining
difficulty decreased at the beginning of the part (3). However,
even though the BCH mining difficulty decreased, peaks due to
fickle mining do not appear because the relative BCH mining
difficulty did not decrease to a value less than k as shown in
Figure 7d. As a result, as can be seen in Figure 8c, the point
moves alternatively between Zone1 and Zone3. One can see
that rF decreased compared with the mining power in the
peaks of Figure 7a-(4) and the peaks in Figure 7a-(2); this
might be because the moving direction in Zone1 is (−,−).
Next, the peaks in the period P presented in Figure 7a-
(4) appeared due to fickle miners because the BTC mining
difficulty increased. We can check that DBDA in the period P
decreased to a value less than k through Figure 7d. Note that
the fact that the BTC mining difficulty increased makes the
value of DBDA decrease. Indeed, the two peaks of the period
P show that rF decreases and then increases because rF +
rB is represented in the period P of Figure 7a. This may be
explained according to our model as follows: the state was near
to the boundary between Zone1 and Zone3 at the beginning of
Figure 7-(4), and then the state entered Zone3 while moving
in the direction (−,−) (the moving direction in Zone1) as in
Figure 8d. Then, the state in Zone3 moved in the direction
(+,−) in agreement with our game, and one can see that the
third peak (i.e., the beginning of the second gray colored zone
in Figure 7a-(4)) is higher than the second peak. After that,
rF decreases (see the second gray colored zone in Figure 7a-
(4)), showing a deviation from our model, which is indicated
by the black arrow in Figure 8d. Indeed, considering this case
as well as Figure 7-(3), we observe such noises in the case
where DBDA changes to a value close to k.
Next, as shown in Figure 8e, the point in Zone3 moves
in the direction (+,−) again because peaks in Figure 7a-(5)
are higher than that for Figure 7a-(4). Moreover, in Figure 7c-
(4)∼(6), k is roughly decreasing and even drops to about 0.055
in a few cases. In the meantime, the point passes boundary1,3.
Because the state entered Zone1, rF starts to decrease,
moving in the direction (−,−) (as shown in Figure 8f).
Therefore, the first peak in Figure 7a-(6) is smaller than the
last peak in Figure 7a-(5). Then, because the second peak is
higher than the first peak in Figure 7a-(6), one can see that the
point moved in the direction (+,−) in Zone3 in agreement
with our model, which is, in turn, depicted in Figure 8f.
As can be seen in Figure 8g, rB first increases in Figure 7a-
(7), and the point enters Zone1; this is a deviation from our
analysis, which may be explained because the BCH mining
is momentarily more profitable than the BTC mining at the
time. Here, we can see again the noise in the case where the
value of DBDA is close to k. However, rB decreases again in
agreement with our model. In addition, one can see that rF
decreases in the meantime because the starting height of the
peak in Figure 7a-(8), which is marked by a red point, is less
than that of the final peak in Figure 7a-(6). Therefore, the point
in Zone1 moved in the direction (−,−) and entered Zone3,
conforming with our analysis.
Then, in the second week of Nov. 2017, the price of BCH
was suddenly pumped (k ≈ 0.4 in some cases). Therefore,
Zone2 widens in Figure 8h. Also, the point in Zone3 contin-
uously moves in the direction (+,−), and rF even increases to
over 0.5. It can be seen that the peak in Figure 7-(8) has a right-
angle trapezoid with a positive slope, which indicates that rF
continuously increases even though it was already high. From
the history, we observe that the Bitcoin system often reaches
the lack of BCH loyal miners. However, a breakthrough exists
even in this bad situation. If k continuously increases, Zone2
widens, and it makes the state enter Zone2 and reach close
to the coexistence equilibrium. As a result, considering the
state of Bitcoin as of Nov. 13, 2017, k had to increase to a
minimum of 0.5 in order for the mining power engaging in
fickle mining to decrease.
Close to coexistence. However, at the end of Figure 7-(8),
another hard fork occurred in BCH for updating the difficulty
adjustment algorithm, and this influenced the status as an
external factor. Consequently, the point jumped into Zone2
due to this hard fork as shown in Figure 8h. After the hard
fork, the point moves in the direction (−,+), reaching close to
coexistence. This is shown by this fact that fluctuations became
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stable more and more in the beginning of Figure 7a-(9). Note
that peaks occur in a short time after the hard fork because
the BCH mining difficulty is quickly adjusted. Even though
the state has been close to coexistence, fickle mining is still
possible and observed as described in Section II. In addition,
as the price continuously changes, the point sometimes enters
Zone3 where fickle mining increases, alternating up and down
in the red semicircle in Figure 8i. In other words, fickle
mining will not completely cease. Therefore, if the Bitcoin
state largely deviates from the equilibrium of coexistence due
to external factors such as a sudden change in prices, then it
is still possible to reach the lack of BCH loyal miners.
Influence of the lack of BCH loyal miners. We observe that
the Bitcoin system suffered from the lack of BCH loyal miners
before Nov. 13, 2017. Consequently, the BCH transaction
process speed periodically became low, and it even took about
four hours to generate one block in some cases. Moreover,
we can see that BCH was significantly centralized during
the period in which the BCH mining difficulty is high. For
example, when considering blocks generated from Oct. 2 to
Oct. 4, only two accounts generated about 70 % of blocks and
there were only five miners who conducted BCH mining. We
note that, in blockchain systems using a PoW mechanism,
high mining power is an essential factor for high security
blockchain systems. In practice, BCH before Nov. 13, 2017
was susceptible to double spending attacks with only 1∼2%
of the total computational power in the Bitcoin system. There
is also selfish mining [15], which makes the attacker unfairly
earn the extra reward while others suffer a loss. Because of a
decrease in rB, these attacks can be executed with relatively
small mining power. As a result, fickle mining, which heavily
occurred before Nov. 13, 2017, weakened the performance,
decentralization level, and security of the BCH system.
Influence of the hard fork of BCH. Next, we discuss why
Bitcoin moved toward different equilibria before and after
Nov. 13, 2017. First, in the Bitcoin system before Nov. 13,
2017, rF considerably increased as can be seen in Figure 7a-
(2). Meanwhile, after Nov. 13, 2017, rF did not considerably
increase even though the point passed Zone3. This can be
attributed to the different difficulty adjustment algorithms
before and after Nov. 13, 2017; the mining difficulty of BCH
is currently adjusted faster than that before Nov. 13, 2017.
Therefore, currently, to conduct fickle mining, miners must
switch between BTC and BCH relatively fast; this would make
the current fickle mining in the Bitcoin system annoying. Then,
can we regard the current state of BCH to be safe if the system
avoids external factors such as a sudden change in prices? We
delay the answer until Section VIII.
B. The ”hash war” between Bitcoin ABC and Bitcoin SV
According to our model, we also describe the “hash war”
that recently occurred between Bitcoin ABC (ABC) and
Bitcoin SV (BSV), which are derived from the original BCH
on Nov. 15, 2018. In this paper, we call ‘Bitcoin ABC’ ABC
rather than BCH to avoid confusion with the original BCH
even though Bitcoin ABC is currently regarded as BCH [34].
This war was caused by the conflict over a BCH update
that adds a new opcode, where the BCH factions split into
a reformist group and an opposing group. As a result, this
conflict caused the two factions to make their own chain,
where the reformist group is the ABC faction led by Roger
Ver (the owner of Bitcoin.com [35]) and Jihan Wu (the
cofounder of Bitmain and also the owner of BTC.com [9] and
Antpool [36]) and the opposing group is the BSV faction led
by Craig Wright and Calvin Ayre (the CEO of Coingeek [37]).
This split of the original BCH was achieved by a hard fork on
Nov. 15, 2018, and each faction wanted its own chain to be
the longest chain in order to unify the divided BCH. This fact
makes both factions desperately conduct mining of their coins
with vast computational power; thus the hash war occurred
from Nov. 15, 2018 to Nov. 24, 2018. Such behavior of ABC
and BSV factions would influence on a general miner who
choose its coin among BTC, ABC, and BSV, and we analyze
this situation by dividing into two games: 1) a game between
BTC and ABC and 2) another game between BTC and BSV.
In both games, cstick became significantly high during the
hash war period, and we can consider this situation as Case 4
(cstick > kk+1 ).
Figure 9. The data for ABC from Nov. 1, 2018 to Dec. 20 2018 is represented.
The mining power of ABC is expressed as a relative value to the total power
in BTC and ABC, and k indicates a relative price of ABC to that for BTC.
Figure 10. The data for BSV from Nov. 15, 2018 to Dec. 20 2018 is
represented. In this figure, mining power of BSV is expressed as a relative
value to the total power in BTC and BSV, and k indicates a relative price of
BSV to that for BTC.
To analyze a phenomenon that appeared due to the hash
war, we collect the data for ABC and BSV. Figure 9 and 10
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Figure 11. The x and y-axes represent time from Nov. 1, 2018 to Dec. 20,
2018 and the number of ABC blocks generated by each miner in previous
100 blocks, respectively. The name of a miner corresponding to each color is
presented at the bottom of this figure.
Figure 12. The x and y-axes represent time from Nov. 15, 2018 to Dec. 20,
2018 and the number of BSV blocks generated by each miner in previous
100 blocks, respectively. The name of a miner corresponding to each color is
presented at the bottom of this figure.
show the ABC data history from Nov. 1, 2018 to Dec. 20,
2018 and the BSV data history from Nov. 15, 2018 to Dec.
20, 2018, respectively. Note that BSV was released on Nov.
15, 2018. In Figure 9, the mining power of ABC is presented
as a relative value to the total mining power of ABC and BTC,
and kk+1 is also presented, where k indicates a relative price
of ABC to that for BTC. Figure 10 depicts the data history of
BSV like Figure 9. These figures show that the state (rF , rB)
in the two games was above the state (0, k1+k ) during the hash
war period.
Moreover, to determine the movement of the state for
the hash war period, we investigate the history of ABC
computational power distribution among miners from Nov.
1, 2018 to Dec. 20, 2018 and that for BSV from Nov. 15,
2018 to Dec. 20, 2018. This is because it would be hard
to determine the movement of the state through just the
mining power history (i.e., Figure 9 and 10) because cstick
significantly changed during this period. Figure 11 and 12
Figure 13. This figure describes the movement of state for hash war period
and the movement of state before and after war.
represent the changes in the mining power distribution of
ABC and BSV over time, respectively. To do this, we crawled
coinbase transactions and analyzed the number of blocks
mined by each miner among previous 100 blocks. In these
figures, each miner corresponds to one color, and the length
of one colored bar represents the number of blocks generated
by the corresponding miner among 100 blocks. Therefore, the
number of colors in the entire bar indicates the number of
active miners at the corresponding time. Note that only names
of ten miners are presented in Figure 11.
First, we consider the game between BTC and ABC. One
can see that the state (rF , rB) jumps to a point above ( kk+1 , 0)
for the hash war preparation period (from Nov. 13, 2018
to Nov.15, 2018) through Figure 9. Such an increase in the
ABC mining power may be explained because the mining
power of BSV factions such as CoinGeek, svpool, BMG pool,
and Mempool increased from the hash war preparation [38]
as shown in Figure 11. In other words, the increase in the
ABC mining power for the hash war preparation is because
cstick increased. On the other hand, Figure 11 shows that
some miners left the ABC system during the war preparation
(the colors that appeared at the top of the figure before the
war preparation period disappeared from the war preparation
period). This fact indicates that the state moves toward the
line rB = cstick in the case that cstick is large. Note that the
reason why the ABC mining power decreases at the end of the
hash war preparation period (i.e., the start of the hash war) is
that BSV factions move to the BSV system.
Next, for the hash war period, the ABC mining power
increased because the ABC factions such as Bitcoin.com
increased their mining power (i.e., cstick increased) [34].
However, there were only a few loyal ABC miners during this
period. For example, at the start of the hash war, only five
miners exist: Bitcoin.com, BTC.com, AntPool, ViaBTC, and
BTC.TOP. Note that all of them are the ABC factions (ViaBTC
and BTC.TOP announced that they support ABC [39], [40]).
As a result, we can see that this state is close to the state
rB = cstick, which represents a lack of BCH loyal miners.
This state makes the ABC system severely centralized. In
particular, one miner (Bitcoin.com) possessed about 60 % of
the total computational power in some cases, which indicates
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the breakage of censorship resistance. Meanwhile, after the
hash war (i.e., when cstick is less than kk+1 ), one can see
that more other miners gradually enter the ABC system (see
the increase in the number of colors after the hash war in
Figure 11). In addition, Figure 9 shows that the state is close
to kk+1 after the hash war. As a result, the state moves as
shown in Figure 13.
Second, we describe the game between BTC and BSV
through Figure 10 and 12. As shown in Figure 10, the state
is above (0, kk+1 ) for the hash war period because cstick is
significantly high. This fact is also presented in Figure 12.
Note that CoinGeek, svpool, BMG, and Mempool are BSV
factions. Therefore, the state was close to rB = cstick at the
time. Similar to ABC, BSV also suffered from the severe
centralization due to a lack of loyal miners. However, the
other miners have entered the BSV system after the hash war,
and the state became close to (0, kk+1 ). Therefore, Figure 13
represents the state movement, and this result empirically
confirms our theoretical analysis.
Here, note that when the state is located above kk+1 , Ωstick
suffers a loss. This fact makes the state cstick > kk+1 would
not last for a long time. Therefore, the hash war was also not
able to continue for a long time, and the hash war ended with
BSV’s surrender [41].
VIII. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
In this section, we describe broader implications of our
game model. More precisely, we first describe the risk of
automatic mining, and then explain how one coin can exploit
this risk to intentionally steal the loyal miners from other less
valued coins with negligible efforts and resources.
A. A potential risk of automatic mining
As described above, the current state of Bitcoin is close
to coexistence between BTC and BCH because faster BCH
mining difficulty adjustment makes manual fickle mining
inconvenient. We introduce another possible mining scheme
called automatic mining, which can be less affected by faster
mining difficulty adjustment. Automatic mining is designed for
miners to automatically switch the coin to mine to the likely
most profitable one of the compatible coins by analyzing their
mining difficulty and coin prices in real time unlike fickle min-
ing. Here, note that all automatic miners almost simultaneously
change their coin when not only mining difficulty but also coin
prices changes. Indeed, automatic mining can be considered
to be automatically choosing the most profitable one among
three strategies, F , A, and B in real time. Automatic mining
has been executed in the Bitcoin system [42] and has already
become popular in the altcoin system [43]. Indeed, mining
power increases and decreases by more than a factor of four
in most altcoins several times a day [44]. We describe a simple
implementation of automatic mining below.
Currently, many mining pools, including BTC.com,
Antpool, and ViaBTC, support interactive user interfaces for
switching the coin to mine by just clicking one button.
Figure 14 represents the one-button switching mining feature
Figure 14. One-button switching mining in Antpool
provided by Antpool. This feature makes automatic mining
easier without technical difficulties in implementing this ap-
proach. For example, a miner can conduct automatic mining
in Antpool as follows.
1) First, the miner saves an HTTP header with its cookies
to maintain the login session.
2) To determine which coin is more profitable, the miner
calculates the mining profitability of BTC and BCH. In
real-world settings, this can be simply implemented by
using real-time coin prices [45], [46] and the coin mining
difficulty.
3) If BTC mining is more profitable than BCH mining, the
miner sends an HTTP request, which includes the saved
HTTP header and data for switching to BTC mining.
Otherwise, the miner sends an HTTP request to conduct
BCH mining.
4) The above steps are repeated.
As shown in the code [47], this automatic mining can be
executed within about 50 lines in Python.
Large-scale automatic mining makes the state of the coin
system enter Zone3. As a simple example, we can consider
an extreme case wherein the entire computational power is
involved in automatic mining. In this case, any initial state
except for (0, kk+1 ) immediately reaches the equilibrium rB =
cstick as soon as all miners start automatic mining. This is
because all automatic miners should simultaneously choose
the same coin and would eventually mine coinA when the
mining difficulty of coinB increases.
Then, we have the following question: What ratio of auto-
matic mining power is needed to reach the lack of coinB-loyal
miners? As shown in Figure 4, the state (rF , rB) cannot be
in Zone2 when rF is not less than k. Therefore, (rF , rB)
where rF ≥ k would move in the decreasing direction of rB.
Further, even manual miners who do not conduct automatic
mining would prefer coinA rather than coinB at states in Zone3
where rF ≥ k because coinA-only mining is more profitable
than coinB-only mining at the states; loyal miners of coinB
should generate blocks with high difficulty. Therefore, when
a fraction k of the total mining power is involved in the
automatic fickle mining, the state moves towards a lack of
coinB-loyal miners. As of Dec. 2018, because k in the Bitcoin
system is about 0.05, if 5% of the total mining power in the
Bitcoin system is involved in automatic mining, the automatic
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miners would conduct (automatic) fickle mining and the state
would enters Zone3. Note that if automatic miners of which
the total mining power is 5% conduct coinA-only (or coinB-
only) mining, the state would enter Zone2 (or Zone1). This
is contradiction because the automatic miners should choose
the most profitable strategy. As a result, when only 5% of the
total mining power is involved in the automatic mining, the
number of BCH loyal miners decreases and the BCH system
is finally becoming more centralized.
B. Injuring rivalry coins
In Section VI, we explained how our game G(c, cstick) can
be applied to the Bitcoin system regardless of the BCH mining
difficulty adjustment algorithm. To generalize our game model,
we here consider two types of possible mining difficulty
adjustment algorithms: The first type of algorithm is to adjust
the mining difficulty in a long time period (e.g., two weeks)
while the second type of algorithm is to adjust the mining
difficulty every block or in a short time period in order to
promptly respond to the changes in the mining power. In the
real-world, both types of these mining difficulty adjustment
algorithms are mostly used. For example, BTC and Litecoin
are the cryptocurrency systems using the first type, while
many altcoins including BCH, Ethereum (ETH), and Ethereum
Classic (ETC) are currently using the second type.
We can generalize our game model to any coin system
satisfying the following conditions.
1) Two existing coins share the same mining hardware.
2) The more valued coin coinA between those coins has the
first type of mining difficulty adjustment algorithm.
We note that there is no restriction on the mining difficulty
adjustment algorithm for the less valued coinB in our game
model G∞. When coinB has the first type of mining difficulty
adjustment algorithm, our model can be applied according to
Section IV. Note that we modeled our game in Section IV,
assuming that coinB has the first type of mining difficulty
adjustment algorithm. In addition, in Section VI, we described
why our game can be applied to when coinB has the second
type of mining difficulty adjustment algorithm. Therefore,
regardless of coinB mining difficulty adjustment algorithm,
in the coin system satisfying the above two conditions, the
coinB-loyal miners would leave if at least k fraction of the
total mining power is involved in automatic mining.
Next, we explain how the more valued coin can steal
loyal miners from the other less valued rivalry coin. If coinA
utilizes the first type of mining difficulty adjustment algorithm,
the number of coinB-loyal miners would naturally decrease
due to the automatic mining. Again note that this situation
periodically weakens the health of the coinB system in terms
of security and decentralization. On one hand, if coinA has
a mining difficulty adjustment algorithm different from the
first type (i.e., different from that in Assumption 3), our game
model may not be applied. For example, when considering
the Ethereum system consisting of ETH and ETC, ETH
corresponding to coinA has a different difficulty adjustment
algorithm from that which we assumed in our game. In this
case, even if rB = 0, the complete downfall of coinB (e.g.,
ETC) may not occur and the mining power of coinA and coinB
would fluctuate heavily. Therefore, to follow our game and
so steal the loyal miners from coinB, coinA should change its
mining difficulty adjustment algorithm through a hard fork. We
can see that some cryptocurrency systems (e.g., BCH, ETH,
and ETC) have often performed hard forks to change their
mining difficulty adjustment algorithms [48], [49], [50]. This
indicates that cryptocurrency systems can practically update
their mining difficulty adjustment algorithms if needed.
In conclusion, if the mining difficulty adjustment algorithm
for coinA is changed to the first type of mining difficulty
adjustment algorithms, a lack of loyal miners for coinB might
be reached due to automatic mining.
IX. DISCUSSION
In this section, we first discuss how coinB can maintain
its loyal miners and consider environmental factors that may
affect our game analysis results.
A. Maintenance of coinB-loyal miners
As described in Section VIII-B, coinB cannot prevent the
rivalry coin from stealing loyal miners by changing its diffi-
culty adjustment algorithm alone. Surely, the most straight-
forward way to avoid the risk is to not use the mining
hardware compatible with coinA. That is, a proprietary mining
algorithm, requiring customized mining hardware which is
not compatible with coinA, should be introduced for coinB.
However, this solution is not applicable in practice for small
and medium-sized mining operators because it is expensive to
develop customized mining hardware (e.g., ASICs). In fact,
because many altcoins use a mining algorithm that can be
implemented in CPU or GPU, automatic mining endangers
their mining power, weakening their security.
The second way is to use auxiliary proof-of-work (or
merged mining), which makes a miner conduct mining more
than two coins at the same time [51]. Therefore, our first
assumption in Section IV is not satisfied by merged mining,
and our game results would not be applied. This is also
regarded as a potential solution to 51% attacks because it
significantly increases mining power of altcoins [52]. However,
despite of such definite advantages, most projects do not adopt
merged mining because of following reasons: It is complex to
implement merged mining, and miners should do additional
work [52].
The another way is to increase the price of coinB through
price manipulation. However, as far as we know, the problem
of maintaining the increased coin price through price manip-
ulation is not well-studied. Moreover, we can consider a way
to increase the relative incentive of coinB mining to coinA
mining, where it can be achieved by increasing the block
reward or decreasing the average time of block generation.
Even though this method may help prevent the rivalry coin
from stealing loyal miners, it would cause other side effects
such as inflation or the increase in fork rate [25], [18].
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Lastly, coinB can change its consensus protocol, the PoW
mechanism, to another protocol. However, this process would
not be supported by existing miners in coinB. For example,
Ethereum is planning to switch from a proof-of-work mech-
anism to a proof-of-stake mechanism for several years. How-
ever, note that if the consensus protocol is just changed through
a hard fork, the existing miners may leave because they can
lose their own merits (e.g., powerful hardware capability) for
mining coinB.
B. Environmental factors
In practice, miners’ behavior can deviate from our model
because of the following environmental factors.
Not all miners are rational. First, miners are not always
rational or wise. Even if fickle mining or coinA mining is more
profitable than coinB mining, some miners may be reluctant
to engage in fickle mining or coinA mining because they may
not recognize the profitability in doing so. However, our data
analysis confirms that most miners are rational. In addition, if
miners use the automatic mining function, they would always
follow the most profitable strategy.
Some miners consider the long-term price of coins. Because
price prediction is significantly difficult [53], we believe that
most miners behave depending on the short-term price of
a coin rather than the long-term price. For example, who
could have predicted the hash war between ABC and BSV
in advance? Therefore, as can be seen from the history of
the Bitcoin system, most miners behave depending on short-
term profits. To model more realistic and general situations,
our model considered both rational miners who are interested
in short-term profits and coinB factions (Ωstick) which are
interested in long-term profits.
Some miners prefer the stable coexistence of coins. Some
miners may want the stable coexistence of coins for coin
market stability, and they may try to reach the equilibrium
representing the coexistence of coins regardless of their profits.
If the fraction of such miners is large, a state would move
to the equilibrium (0, kk+1 ) regardless of its zones. Based on
historical observations of the Bitcoin system, however, the
fraction of these miners seems unlikely to be high in the real-
world.
Other selfish mining. In this study, we considered only fickle
mining, which is a type of rational mining. However, miners
engaging in various form of selfish mining [15], [22], [23],
[24] might cause a deviation from our analysis.
X. CONCLUSION
In this study, we modeled and analyzed the game between
two coins for fickle mining, and our results imply that fickle
mining can lead to a lack of loyal miners in the less valued coin
system. We confirm that this lack of loyal miners can weaken
the overall health of coin systems by analyzing real-world
history. In addition, our analysis is extended to the analysis
of automatic mining, which shows a potentially severe risk
of automatic mining. As of Dec. 2018, BCH’s loyal miners
would leave if more than about 5% of the total mining power
in BTC and BCH is involved in automatic mining. Moreover,
we explained how one coin can steal the loyal miners from
other less valued rivalry coins in the highly competitive coin
market by generalizing our game model. We believe that this
is one of the serious threats for a cryptocurrency system using
a PoW mechanism.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA V.1 AND THEOREM V.2
In order for player i to not change its strategy at (rF , rB),
the below inequalities should be satisfied.
{
UF (rF , rB) ≥ UA(rF − ci, rB),
UF (rF , rB) ≥ UB(rF − ci, rB + ci)
(6){
UA(rF , rB) ≥ UF (rF + ci, rB),
UA(rF , rB) ≥ UB(x, rB + ci)
(7){
UB(rF , rB) ≥ UF (rF + ci, rB − ci),
UB(rF , rB) ≥ UA(x, rB − ci)
(8)
(6) represents that a fickle miner’s payoff decreases when the
fickle miner moves to MA (i.e., UF (rF , rB) ≥ UA(rF −
ci, rB)) or when it moves toMB (i.e., UF (rF , rB) ≥ UB(rF−
ci, rB + ci)). Similarly, (7) and (8) represent that players in
MA and MB cannot increase their payoff by changing their
strategy, respectively.
To prove Lemma V.1, we first consider the case that cstick =
0, and have the following steps.
1) First, we find all states characterized as (rF , 0) in which
player i does not change its strategy.
2) Second, we show that there is no state characterized as
(0, rB) in which player i does not change its strategy.
3) Finally, there exists ε > 0 such that, for any player i with
ci < ε, a player i can change its strategy at state (rF , rB)
where rB is positive.
First step: We find all states characterized as (rF , 0) in which
player i does not change its strategy, where we denote such
a state by S. In order for (0, 0) to be S, it is sufficient that
(7) is satisfied. Meanwhile, when rF is greater than 0 and less
than 1, in order for (rF , 0) to be S, not only (7) but also (6)
should be satisfied. If rF is 1, only (6) should be satisfied.
First, we consider the condition for (0, 0) to be S. The
payoff UA(0, 0) of players in MA is 1, and the payoff
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UF (ci, 0) of a player who changes its strategy from A to F is
also 1. Because UA(0, 0) ≥ UF (ci, 0), it is sufficient to show
UA(0, 0) ≥ UB(0, ci) in order for (0, 0) to be S. The payoff
UB(0, ci) is kci , and thus, the state (0, 0) cannot be a S for ci
less than k.
Next, we consider (rF , 0) where rF is greater than 0. In
(6), UF (x, 0) and UA(rF − ci, 0) are 1. Moreover, in (6),
UB(rF − ci, ci) ≤ UF (x, 0) can be arranged as follows.
kNinci + kNderF
Ninc2i +Nder
2
F
≤ 1 (9)
⇔ 0 ≤ Nder2F − kNderF −
Nin
n
(k − ci)
⇔ rF ≤ k
2
−
√
N2dek
2 + 4NdeNin(kci − c2i )
2Nde
or (10)
k
2
+
√
N2dek
2 + 4NdeNin(cik − c2i )
2Nde
≤ rF (11)
If ci is less than k, (10) cannot be satisfied because the right-
hand side is negative. Also, if
ci ≤ kNin −
√
k2N2in − 4NdeNin(1− k)
2Nin
≤ or
k2N2in − 4NdeNin(1− k) ≤ 0,
the left-hand side of (11) is less than or equal to 1, and (1, 0)
is S.
By (7), UB(rF , ci) should be less than or equal to 1 in order
that (rF , 0) where rF is greater than 0 and less than 1 is S.
Referring to (11), the following is satisfied:
k
2 +
√
N2dek
2+4NdeNin(cik−c2i )
2Nde
≤ rF + ci ⇒ UB(rF , ci) ≤ 1.
Therefore, when
rF ≤ k
2
+
√
N2dek
2 + 4NdeNin(cik − c2i )
2Nde
,
both (6) and (7) are satisfied. As a result, when
ci ≤ kNin −
√
k2N2in − 4NdeNin(1− k)
2Nin
,
the all points (k2 +
√
N2dek
2+4NdeNin(cik−c2i )
2Nde
≤ rF ≤ 1, 0) are
S.
Second step: As the second step, we show that game
G(c, cstick) does not have state (0, rB) where rB is positive
and player i does not change its strategy. In order for (0, rB)
where rB is greater than 0 and less than 1 to be S, both (7)
and (8) should be satisfied for player i. First, we consider
the inequality UF (ci, rB) ≤ UA(0, rB). This inequality is
expressed as follows:
UF (ci, rB) ≤ UA(0, rB)
⇔ Nde(ci + rB)
2
(1− ci − rB)Ninr2B + (1− rB)Nde(rB + ci)2
+
kNinrB
Ninr2B +Nde(rB + ci)2
≤ 1
1− rB
⇔ k(1− rB)
(
(1− ci − y)Ninr2B + (1− rB)Nde(rB + ci)2
)
≤ rB (1− ci − rB)
(
Ninr
2
B +Nde(rB + ci)
2
)
⇔ kNdeci(1− rB)(rB + ci)2 ≤ ((1 + k)rB − k)×
(1− ci − rB)
(
Ninr
2
B +Nde(rB + ci)
2
)
(12)
The another inequality UF (ci, rB − ci) ≤ UB(0, rB) can be
expressed as follows:
UF (ci, rB − ci) ≤ UB(0, rB)
⇔ Nder
2
B
(1− rB)Nin(rB − ci)2 + (1− rB + ci)Nder2B
+
kNin(rB − ci)
Nin(rB − ci)2 +Nder2B
≤ k
rB
⇔ (Nin(rB − ci)2 +Nder2B) (13)
× (Nder3B − k(1− rB)(Nder2B −Ninci(rB − ci)))
≤ k (Nder2B −Ninci(rB − ci))Nder2Bci
(13) is greater than or equal to Nder2B. Therefore, the following
inequality
Nder
3
B − k(1− rB)(Nder2B −Ninci(rB − ci)) ≤
kci
(
Nder
2
B −Ninci(rB − ci)
)
⇔ Nder3B − k(1 + ci − rB)(Nder2B −Ninci(rB − ci)) ≤ 0
(14)
should be satisfied. We denote the left-hand side of (14) by a
function f(ci) of ci. Moreover, if (15) is satisfied, (12) cannot
be certainly satisfied as follows:
((1 + k)rB − k)Nin < Nde(k(1 + ci)− (1 + k)rB) (15)
⇒((1 + k)rB − k)Ninr2B < Nde(k(1 + ci)− (1 + k)rB)(rB + ci)2
⇔((1 + k)rB − k)(Ninr2B +Nde(rB + ci)2) < kNdeci(rB + ci)2
⇒((1 + k)rB − k) (1− ci − rB)
(
Ninr
2
B +Nde(rB + ci)
2)
< kNdeci(1− rB)(rB + ci)2
Thus, if (15) is satisfied for all rB that satisfies (14), there
would not exist S = (0, rB) where rB is greater than 0 and
less than 1 because any state (0, rB) does not satisfy both (7)
and (8).
We find a condition of ci such that there is no S = (0, rB)
where rB is greater than 0 and less than 1. In other words,
we find a range of ci such that (15) is satisfied for all rB that
satisfies (14). Eq. (15) is equivalent to the following inequality
rB <
k
1 + k
(
1 +
Ndeci
Nde +Nin
)
.
When rB is k1+k
(
1 + NdeciNde+Nin
)
, f(ci) is a quadratic equation
of ci, which has a negative coefficient of c2i . Therefore, we
can easily find a number l such that, for all ci < l, f(ci) is
positive when rB is k1+k
(
1 + NdeciNde+Nin
)
. Then, we find the
derivative ∂f(ci)∂rB , and it is expressed as
3Nde(1+k)r
2
B−2k (Nde(1 + ci) +Ninci) rB+kNinci+2kNinc2i .
(16)
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In order that the derivative is non-negative when rB is not
less than k1+k
(
1 + NdeciNde+Nin
)
, a solution for rB of (16)
should not exist, or all solutions for rB should be less
than k1+k
(
1 + NdeciNde+Nin
)
. If solutions exist, they are positive.
Therefore, when the sum of solutions, 2k(Nde(1+ci)+Ninci)3Nde(1+k) ,
is less than k1+k
(
1 + NdeciNde+Nin
)
, the solutions are less than
k
1+k
(
1 + NdeciNde+Nin
)
. In other words, when 1ci is greater
than 2 + 2NinNde − 3NdeNde+Nin , the solutions are less than
k
1+k
(
1 + NdeciNde+Nin
)
. As a result, if 1ci > max{ 1l , 2 + 2NinNde −
3t
Nde+Nin
}, f(ci) is positive for rF ≥ k1+k
(
1 + NdeciNde+Nin
)
.
This means that, for small ci, (12) cannot be satisfied for all
rB that satisfies (14), and there is no S = (0, rB) where rB is
greater than 0 and less than 1.
For a state (0, 1), (8) should be satisfied to be S. However,
the state (0, 1) does not satisfy (8) except for when 1k ≥ ci.
Note that k is not greater than 1. Therefore, (0, 1) cannot be
S.
Third step: To do the third step, we consider the game
when a player possesses sufficiently small power. When rB
is positive, inequality limci→0 UF (rF + ci, rB) ≤ UA(rF , rB)
is as follows.
lim
ci→0
UF (rF + ci, rB) ≤ UA(rF , rB)
⇔ UF (rF , rB) ≤ UA(rF , rB)
⇔ k
Ninr2B +Nde(rF + rB)2
(17)
≤ rB
(1− rF − rB)Ninr2B + (1− rB)Nde(rF + rB)2
(18)
⇔ k((1− rF − rB)Ninr2B + (1− rB)Nde(rF + rB)2)
≤ rB(Ninr2B +Nde(rF + rB)2) (19)
Also, inequality limci→0 UF (rF + ci, rB − ci) ≤ UB(rF , rB)
is as follows.
lim
ci→0
UF (rF + ci, rB − ci) ≤ UB(rF , rB)
⇔ UF (rF , rB) ≤ UB(rF , rB)
⇔ (rF + rB)(Ninr2B +Nde(rF + rB)2)
≤ k((1− rF − rB)Ninr2B + (1− rB)Nde(rF + rB)2) (20)
The solution which satisfies both (19) and (20) is only
(0, k1+k ). When rB is greater than
k
1+k , only (19) is satisfied
for (0, rB). Meanwhile, if rB is less than k1+k , only (20) is
satisfied for (0, rB). Therefore, the range of (rF , rB), which
satisfies (19), is always above that for (20) except for (0, kk+1 )
and rB = 0 (see Figure 4). It means that there exists a value
ε such that, for all ci < ε and given a positive real number δ,
the line where UF (rF+ci, rB) = UA(rF , rB) is always above
the line where UF (rF + ci, rB − ci) = UB(rF , rB) when rF ,
rB, and 1−rF−rB are in [δ, 1], [ci, 1], and [0, 1], respectively.
For ease of reading, we denote by boundaryA the line where
UF (rF +ci, rB) = UA(rF , rB) when rF , rB, and 1−rF −rB
are in [0, 1], [ci, 1], and [0, 1], respectively. Also, we denote by
boundaryB the line where UF (rF+ci, rB−ci) = UB(rF , rB)
when rF , rB, and 1− rF − rB are in [0, 1], [ci, 1], and [0, 1],
respectively.
Moreover, the derivative ∂rB∂rF |rF=0 on boundaryA is greater
than that the derivative ∂rB∂rF |rF=0 on boundaryB. Because ∂rB∂rF
is a continuous function, there exists a positive real number
δ′ such that, for all x ∈ [0, δ′], the derivative ∂rB∂rF |rF=x
on boundaryA is greater than the derivative ∂rB∂rF |rF=x on
boundaryB. Then, there exists a number ε′ such that, for all
ci < ε
′ and x ∈ [0, δ′], the derivative ∂rB∂rF |rF=x on boundaryA
is greater than that the derivative ∂rB∂rF |rF=x on boundaryB.
Also, as described above, there exists a number ε such that,
for all ci < ε, boundaryA is above boundaryB when rF , rB,
and 1− rF − rB are in [δ′, 1], [ci, 1], and [0, 1], respectively.
In the second step, we showed that (0, rB) cannot be S
where player i does not change its strategy, when 1ci >
max{ 1l , 2 + 2NinNde − 3tNde+Nin }. Therefore,
∀ 1
ci
> max{1
l
, 2+
2Nin
Nde
− 3t
Nde +Nin
,
1
ε′
} and ∀rF ∈ [0, δ′],
a range for (7) is always above that for (8) without any
intersection. As a result, there exist ε′′ as
ε′′ = max{1
l
, 2 +
2Nin
Nde
− 3t
Nde +Nin
,
1
ε
,
1
ε′
}
such that, for all ci < ε′′, (rF , rB) where rB is positive is not
S in the game G(c, cstick).
By the above three steps, if cstick = 0, there exists ε′′
such that, for all ci < ε′′, S is characterized as presented in
Lemma V.1. If cstick > 0, from this result, we can easily see
that the value of rB of S is equal to cstick. To characterize S
in this case, it is sufficient to have the second and third steps
described above.
Moreover, by Lemma V.1, the Nash equilibria in game
G(c, cstick) are characterized as presented in Theorem V.2.
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM V.3
In this section, we show that all Nash equilibria in the game
G(c, cstick) when players possess sufficiently small mining
power. We first consider when cstick is 0. In order for a state
(rF , rB) to be a Nash equilibrium in the game G(c, cstick),
the following equation should be satisfied:∑
s∈Smax
rs = 1 when Smax = arg max
s∈{F,A,B}
Us(rF , rB)
The above equation means that all players belong to the most
profitable group among MF , MA, and MB. In other words,
in order for a point (rF , rB) to be an equilibrium, either 1)
UF , UA, and UB have the same value at the point, or 2) all
miners should be in the most profitable group at the point.
If both of them are not satisfied, some players would change
their strategy to the most profitable one.
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First, we consider that three payoffs are the same. The case
that payoffs of MF and MA are the same is equal to
rB = 0 or
k
Ninr2B +Nde(rF + rB)2
=
rB
(1− rF − rB)Ninr2B + (1− rB)Nde(rF + rB)2
.
(21)
The case that payoffs ofMF andMB are the same equal to
rF + rB = 0 or
k
Ninr2B +Nde(rF + rB)2
=
rF + rB
(1− rF − rB)Ninr2B + (1− rB)Nde(rF + rB)2
.
(22)
By finding a solution satisfying both (21) and (22), we can
derive that three payoffs have the same value at the points
(rF = 0, rB = kk+1 ) and (rF = k, rB = 0). Therefore, these
two points are equilibria.
Second, we consider three cases, when all miners belong
to only two groups: 1) MF and MA have the same mining
profit density when rB is 0, 2) MA and MB have the same
mining profit density when rF is 0, and 3) MF and MB
have the same mining profit density when rF + rB is 1. In
the first case, in order for the case to be equilibria, MF and
MA are profitable than MB. Therefore, when rF is not less
than k, the case can be an equilibrium. In other words, (k ≤
rF ≤ 1, rB = 0) is a Nash equilibrium. In the second case,
given that rF is 0, rB should be kk+1 in order that MA andMB have the same payoff. We already showed that the point
(0, kk+1 ) is an equilibrium. The final case is impossible except
for when k is 1. If k is 1, only point (1, 0) belongs to the final
case. Also, we already showed above that the point (1, 0) is
an equilibrium.
Finally, we consider three cases, when all players belong to
just one group: 1) all players are inMF , 2)MA, and 3)MB.
As we demonstrated above, the first case (rF = 1, rB = 0)
is an equilibrium. The second case represents (rF = 0, rB =
0). In the second case, MA has the mining profit density 1.
However, players in MA would shift to other groups because
payoffs of MF and MB diverge to infinity. Therefore, this
case cannot be an equilibrium. The third case presents (rF =
0, rB = 1). In this case,MB has the payoff k, and payoffs for
other strategies diverge to infinity. Therefore, players in MB
shift to others, and this is not an equilibrium. As a result, all
equilibria in the game G(c, cstick = 0) are (rF = 0, rB =
k
k+1 ) and (k ≤ rF ≤ 1, rB = 0).
In the same manner, we can determine all Nash equilibria
in game G(c, cstick = 0) when cstick > 0. Then the equilibria
are (3).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM VI.1
In this section, we first consider cstick = 0. At the state
(0, k1+k ), the two payoffs of coinA mining and coinB mining
are the same as 1 + k. Also, the payoff of MF has the same
value of 1 + k, because the mining difficulty of both coinA
and coinB would not change and thus MF does not change
the coin to mine. Therefore, rational miners do not revise
their strategies at (0, k1+k ), and the state (0,
k
1+k ) is a Nash
equilibrium. Indeed, in order for the payoffs of MF , MA,
and MB to be the same, MF should not change the coin to
be mined like in the state (0, k1+k ). If not, the coinB mining
difficulty would periodically change because of fickle miners.
In this case, we first assume that the payoffs of MA and
MB are the same. Then the coinB mining is more profitable
than the coinA mining when the coinB mining difficulty is
low. Conversely, when the coinB mining difficulty is high,
the coinA mining is more profitable than the coinB mining.
Therefore,MF would earn more profit than that forMA and
MB because they conduct the coinB mining only when its
difficulty is low. This fact implies that, in a state where MF
changes its preferred coin, the payoffs ofMF ,MA, andMB
cannot be the same. By using this property, one can easily find
that there exist only the states (0, k1+k ) and (k, 0) where the
three payoffs are the same.
In the states (k < rF ≤ 1, rB = 0), the mining difficulty of
coinA is eventually maintained as 1 while the mining difficulty
of coinB is maintained as more than k. Thus, the payoffs of
MF and MA are 1 at the states. To find the payoff of MB
in the states, we consider states (k < rF ≤ 1, rB = δ)
for sufficiently small δ. Note that UB(rF , 0) is defined as
limδ→0 UB(rF , δ). In (k < rF ≤ 1, rB = δ), the mining
difficulty of coinB would have value d ∈ (k, rF ] most of
the time, because fickle mining that heavily occurs increases
the mining difficulty of coinB by a high value and it takes a
significantly long time for MB with the mining power δ to
find blocks with the high mining difficulty d. Therefore, the
payoff UB(k < rF ≤ 1, 0) of MB as kd is less than 1. This
means that rational miners do not change their strategies to B
at the states, and states (k ≤ rF ≤ 1, rB = 0) representing
the downfall of coinB are Nash equilibria. Meanwhile, in states
(rF < k, rB = 0), rational miners would move toMB because
MB’s payoff is greater than 1 while MF and MA’s payoffs
are 1.
In addition, like in Figure 4, boundary1,3 is always above
boundary2,3 except the point (0, kk+1 ) in the triangle area.
Note that boundary1,3 refers to a line on which the payoffs
ofMF andMA are the same while rB > 0, and boundary2,3
refers to a line on which the payoffs of MF and MB are the
same. When rB = 0, the payoffs of MF and MA are always
the same because MF would mine only coinA eventually. If
we assume that boundary1,3 and boundary2,3 have another
intersection point, not (0, kk+1 ), in the triangle area, the payoffs
of MF , MA, and MB would be the same for at least three
points. This is a contradiction because the three payoffs are
the same at only two points, (0, k1+k ) and (k, 0). Moreover,
boundary2,3 intersects with the line rB = 0 at the point (k, 0)
because payoffs of MF , MA, and MB are the same at the
point. Meanwhile, boundary1,3 does not intersect with the
line rB = 0. This is because MF is trivially most profitable
at (k ≤ rF ≤ 1, rB = δ) for sufficiently small δ, and the
difference between payoffs ofMF andMA (i.e., UF−UA) is
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a decreasing function of rB when rF is given. Indeed, when rF
is given, the greater rB, the smaller rA is and the lower coinA
mining difficulty is. Therefore, when rB increases, the profit,
which fickle miners earn by mining coinA, increases, and this
means that, for given rF , UF−UA is a decreasing function of
rB. Similarly, for given rF , UF−UB is an increasing function
of rB. Because of these facts, boundary2,3 does not intersect
with the line rF + rB = 0 while boundary1,3 intersects at
one point of the line rF + rB = 0. As a result, even when the
mining difficulty of coinB is adjusted in a short time period, the
game G(c, cstick = 0) has Nash equilibria and dynamics such
as in Figure 4. This fact also makes the game G(c, cstick > 0)
have dynamics presented in Figure 4.
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